This paper examines the impact of all-star analyst turnover on initial public offering market share and the performance of initial public offerings. We find that investment banks losing all-stars do not experience a uiring the all-star analyst experiences a market share of 1.25 percent. In response to losing a star analyst, investment banks begin to compete more on price by cutting the abnormal spread and take on more speculative nd become more + We gratefully acknowledge the contribution of I/B/E/S International Inc. for providing earnings per share forecast data, available through the Brokers Estimate System. This data has been provided as part of broad academic program to encourage earnings expectations research. We also thank James Brau, Mark Huson, Shawn Thomas, and seminar participants at the All-Georgia Finance Conference for helpful comments. Abstract significant change in market share. In contrast, the bank acq significant increase in issuers. The banks gaining the all-stars also take on more speculative issuers a aggressive by issuing research reports earlier and more often.
Introduction
are essential for le for top analysts and IPOs becomes circular since the higher an analyst ranks in the polls, the easier it is for their firm to win IPOs, and the more quality companies the firm brings to market and does banking business with, the e reflected in their on dollars in cash the popular press, however, there is little direct evidence that all-star analysts influence initial public offering market share.
In this paper, we directly examine the impact of analyst reputation on the initial public offering market al Investor's Alleam who subsequently switch investment banks. We examine whether the gain (los ining changes to a bank's market share. We also examine how the gain or loss of an all-star affects subsequent investment bank and analyst behavior.
at the presence of fferings, because n empirical tests, (II) ranking has a positive effect on changes to its market share. Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001) examine a sample of firms that switch underwriters following their initial public offering. They find that obtaining
Institutional Investor all-star coverage is one of the most important motives for issuers to switch underwriters. They argue that issuers place significant value on high-quality research coverage and are willing to pay in the form of higher underwriting fees.
There is substantial anecdotal evidence suggesting that top-rated analysts attracting investment-banking business. For example, Kessler (2001) Two papers in the literature are related to our study. Dunbar (2000) argues th strong analysts is likely to be attractive to firms wishing to conduct initial public o analyst reputation can certify to potential investors that a deal is not overpriced. I
Dunbar finds that the percentage change in an investment bank's Institutional Investor
We expand on the work of Dunbar (2000) and Krigman et al. (2001) in five important ways.
ows us to examine the market share oes not allow for this potential asymmetry in his analysis. Third, we examine market share at both an aggregate and industry level. Fourth, we consider the impact of all-star analyst turnover on bank and analyst behavior in ts the pricing and forecasts made by eir behavior in an attempt to preserve or expand IPO market share around the time of the turnover. Finally, we examine the factors affecting changes in IPO market share for banks gaining and losing all-star analysts in a regression ers a number of factors not previously considered, incl t share changes at bank, potentially providing a more powerful test of market share changes.
Contrary to popular belief, we find that investment banks losing all-stars do not experience a arture of the star.
O market. Banks r appear to compete for business by cutting their fees in IPOs. After the star's departure, the rem sts earlier. There is no evidence that the investment bank changes its objectivity in an effort to retain market share, however. Earnings forecasts relative to the consensus do not change significantly following the departure of the all-star.
In contrast, we find that acquiring an all-star analyst has a positive impact on an investment bank's market share. The bank's overall market share increases a statistically significant 1.260
First, rather than treating all-star standing as static as in Krigman et al., our analysis all the dynamic relation between market share and all-star analyst status. Second, we allow relations to be different for banks gaining versus banks losing stars. Dunbar (2000) d the market for IPOs. Specifically we examine whether gaining or losing a star affec performance of IPOs. We also consider whether gaining or losing a star affects earning analysts. In doing so, we attempt to determine whether banks and analysts alter th framework, as in Dunbar (2000) . Our analysis consid uding measures of analyst behavior. Also, whereas Dunbar (2000) examines marke a fixed point (calendar year end), we consider changes after a significant shock to the significant decline in either industry level or aggregate market share following the dep However, losing an all-star does impact the bank's pricing and performance in the IP losing a sta aining analysts at the bank losing the star become more aggressive by issuing foreca ce of initial public offerings. Banks are more likely to make positive price adjustments in the IPO pricing process after they acquire a star analyst. This is consistent with the star using his or her reputation to acquire more positive e long-run stock y worse than the sistent with banks becoming aggressive by selecting issuers of more questionable quality in an attempt to expand IPO market share. Analysts at the bank gaining the star begin recommending firms earlier and more often.
hat banks take on change, however,
Building on the analysis in Dunbar (2000), we examine the factors affecting IPO market share to measures of IPO pricing and performance, including abnormal first-day returns, one-year abnormal returns, and abnormal underwriting fees for the bank in the year prior to the move. A new measure of performance considered and an assumed 7 percent spread, this improvement to market share translates into a $2 in fees for the bank. This provides some justification for the huge salaries recei analysts. The gains to market share are largest when the bank has few existing all-star star. When the investment bank is able to acquire an analyst named to Institution Second, or Third Team, industry market share increases a statistically significant 4.326
Acquiring an all-star also has a significant impact on the pricing and performan information during the IPO marketing process (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989) . Th performance of issuers taken public by banks after acquiring a star is significantl performance of issuers taken public by the banks prior to acquiring the star. This is con
The volatility of earnings forecasts relative to consensus increases, also suggesting t more speculative deals. Average earnings forecasts relative to consensus do not suggesting that aggressiveness does not affect the analyst's objectivity.
changes around analyst turnover. Like Dunbar, we relate market share changes in our analysis is the price adjustments made by banks in the IPO pricing process. We also consider a e to first forecast, ntage of offerings where the lead bank is first to make forecasts, and the forecast level relative to con Our evidence reverses several findings by Dunbar (2000) . For banks losing a star analyst, we find that market share changes are positively related to past mean abnormal underpricing. The organization of the remainder of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we develop our basic hypotheses regarding the impact of all-star analyst turnover on investment bank market share. We summarize the all-star turnover data in section 3. Section 4 examines market share effects for banks gaining and losing all-star analysts. In section 5, we examine the pricing and performance of IPOs and analyst forecast activity around analyst turnover. In section 6, we identify the factors affecting IPO market share for banks gaining and losing all-stars. Finally, we summarize the paper in Section 7.
number of measures of analyst performance, including the number of forecasts, the tim the perce sensus.
more money on the table are rewarded with increased share in the IPO market. For both banks gaining a star, k returns of past IPOs. This suggests that banks taking on riskier issues are a the volatility of price adjustments made on past IPOs. Banks able to extract more positive and negative) from investors in the IPO pricing process attract more future share changes are also positively related to various measures of analyst aggressivene sensus. Banks with analysts who make higher earnings forecasts on firms the rewarded with greater future business. Finally, for banks gaining an all-star, the vol forecasts relative to consensus is positively related to market share changes. This is con increasing their presence in the IPO market by taking on more speculative issuers. investors will avoid purchasing shares from banks that systematically sell overpriced securities).
Investment Bank Market
Conversely, banks that enhance their reputation through a record of accurate certification should gain d an inverse nd underpricing.
3
The presence of an All-American analyst is likely to have significant impact on the reputation of omack (1999) note that analysts play an active role in underwriting t an offering is not overpriced since more is at stake (mispricing damages both the bank and analyst's reputation). This
The primary focus of our analysis is on the effects of all-star turnover on the IP 2 bank gaining (losing) a star analyst should significantly increase (decrease). An e examines the impact of investment bank reputation on the IPO market. Insiders have regarding the true value of their firm and an incentive to offer securities when they are o "intrinsic value" if insiders credibly certify that they are not selling overpriced certification mechanism is to hire a reputable investment bank to manage the offering.
third party certifiers because they lose future business if their certification is found to market share. Consistent with the certification story, Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) ur and Fulgheiri, 1994) , banks concerned with their market share may expand the ive in the services they provide to issuers in an attempt to gain business (e.g. make earlier and more frequent analyst forecasts and recommendations).
ore aggressive after the competition is resolved and the analyst moves. The bank losing the star will attempt to preserve their position in the market to star will be more lyst salaries II as a guide, we then assign each of these analysts to one of the 48 Fama-French I us to match the analy 6 Over the 1988 to 1999 period, an average of 3150 analysts from 238 brokerage houses submitted forecasts to I/B/E/S each year. 7 Over the four-year period beginning the three years prior to the turnover date, 67% of our sample was named to an all-star team multiple times. 8 The median length of time between the analyst's first forecast with the new employer and the last forecast with the previous employer is 24 trading days. We eliminate cases where the elapsed time is greater than 100 trading days. 9 The industries with highest turnover of star analysts are Communications (18 cases), Business Services (18 cases), and Chemicals (17 cases).
it should be noted that our turnover sample only includes cases where an all-star switched from one inve s.
choice of II's Allnd Nocera (1997) note that sell-side analysts generally aspire to be II All-Americans. Stickel (1992) Interestingly, the number of initial public offerings in the analyst's i significantly in the post-turnover period. In the year following the departure of the a industries in anticipation of the increase in deal activity.
While these results seem to suggest that star analysts, on average, increase the market share of the banks to which they move, it is important to note that causality could be an issue. For e numbers begin oing better in months -18 to -12 than the bank that the analyst switches from difference is insignificant in months -6 to 0. This result is not consistent with analysts variables. We stratify the sample by (1) whether the all-star was replaced by anot original bank, (2) the number of total all-stars at the bank prior to the star's arrival, (3 Investor ranking of the analyst, and (4) (losing) a star from (to) a bank that already was far more reputable or less reputable significant impact on a bank's ability to compete for business. The market aggressiveness hypotheses would make similar predictions. 13 We measure pre-move re 12 Much of the existing literature assumes that reputation is a function solely of actions taken by a given bank (e.g. Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; Dunbar, 2000; Krigman, Womack, and Shaw, 2001) . In this view, relative stature should not have an impact on market share. Investment banks compete for a fixed number of offerings, however, suggesting that reputation should be viewed in a relative sense. Mispricing by one bank might not damage its reputation if others perform more poorly, for example. 13 The bank aggressiveness hypothesis could predict the opposite for banks losing a star. When losing a star to a bank of similar stature, the losing bank may become even more aggressive. This could mitigate and gains (losses) in market share for the bank acquiring (losing) the star.
Carter-Manaster ranking. We group all-star turnovers based on whether pre-move Carter-Manaster 14 r analyst, we find l) for these groups have similar premove reputation, consistent with all three hypotheses). We also split the sample by whether the analyst was a star in only one or in multiple years. Gain or loss of an analyst that has been ranked a star in e results are mixed.
Acq n industry market te market share.
We also stratify the sample by number of stars at the bank making recommendations in the In this section we examine both the pricing and performance of IPOs and analyst forecast activity around star turnovers. While the evidence on market share appears to be primarily consistent with the investment bank aggressiveness hypothesis, an examination of bank and analyst behavior should yield a deeper understanding of how banks losing stars are able to preserve market share and how banks acquiring a star expand market share. We perform both industry level and aggregate market share market share as acquiring a star in industries having fewer growth prospects. The rel market share changes and the star analyst's industry market-to-book ratio is an empiri stratify the turnover sample by whether the analyst is from a high-growth industr growth industries, consistent with the valuation uncertainty story. Table 4 presents similar market share stratifications for the bank losing the all-s aggregate market share decreases significantly if the star analyst is replaced at the ori competitive in the star's industry but this focus (and perhaps an overall drop in sta overall. Self-selection could affect the interpretation of this result. Only in those cases wher departure is damaging to the bank and its ability to gain business will the bank attempt t sistent with self-selection on the part of the losing bank.
Bank and Analyst Performance in the IPO Market
analysis. Since the results are similar, we only report the results of the aggregate market share analysis, so that our results can be compared to earlier papers.
5.1
For banks losing or gaining stars, we examine the underwriter spread, the initial (first day) returns, the price adjustments and the one-year post offering abnormal return for issuers taken public by all-star might give market power to the bank relative to the issuer. This gain in market power could lead to an increase in u e table 2), issuers theory to formally make this point). On the other hand, banks losing a star should lose market power, leading to lower initial returns.
The investment bank aggressiveness hypothesis yields no obvious predictions regarding IPO initial returns. As noted previously, banks both losing and gaining a star analyst may be more aggressive in selecting issuers, resulting in a pool of firms that are more speculative and of lower average quality.
IPO pricing and performance -hypotheses
the banks over the year before and after the analyst turnover.
The certification hypothesis discussed previously argues that banks with grea price IPOs closer to intrinsic value, resulting in lower first day returns.
In contrast, the market power hypothesis predicts that initial returns should increase gaining a star analyst and decrease for firms losing the star. Loughran and Ritter (2 underwriters are given discretion in allocating shares, they will not always act in the b public that has good prospects enhances reputation, whereas taking a firm public that has poor prospects hurts reputation. Empirically, firms with good (poor) prospects should have positive (negative) abnormal long-run performance. If all-star analysts have a superior ability to screen the quality of deals, then the better able to uncover both positive and negative inform stments should also increase (decrease) after gaining (losing) a star.
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The market power hypothesis would predict that partial adjustments are more greater market power can manage those expectations in part by initially suggesting
When the bank increases the price during the bookbuilding process, the issuer becomes and does not complain if the resulting underpricing is in large. Banks losing a star adjustments but fewer negative price adjustments).
The investment bank aggressiveness hypo stments for both banks acquiring and losing a star analyst (by taking on more s
The long-run performance of issuers may also be affected by all-star analys certification model of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) , two types of firms attempt firms that have good prospects after the offering and firms that have poor prospects
Investment banks evaluate firms, and market only those firms that they believe have g bank's reputation evolves based on its ability to accurately screen for good performe The bank aggressiveness hypothesis would predict that banks losing and banks gaining a star
The average quality of issuers should decline, man rs should increase,
IPO pricing and performance -Empirical methods and results
For those firms with CRSP data, underpricing is defined as: 100*(P 1st day close -P offer )/P offer , where P 1st day close is the closing price at the end of the first-day of trading and P offer is the offering price from SDC. Following Dunbar (2000), our measure of the underwriting spread is defined as 100*(SP/P offer ),
where SP is the gross spread per share in the offering and P offer is the offering price. Price adjustment for (gaining) an all-star should be more negative (more positive) than prior to the move. Our analysis of IPO pricing and performance for banks losing and acquiring a star analyst is summarized in Table 5 . For the bank gaining the all-star, we find no significant change in abnormal ivided by the average of the high and low initial filing prices.
Beatty and Ritter (1986), Beatty and Vetsuypens (1995) , and Dunbar (2000) normal, or predictable, variation in the above-mentioned IPO performance variable firm and market condition variables suggested in the literature (see Appendix A abnormal first-day return is then defined as the actual per rn, using the estimated regression results for the year the issuer goes public. Our measure of month of trading through the following twelve months. In order to measure abnormal r matched with a portfolio of public firms based on the issuer's market capitalization ratio. Market capitalization is computed as the IPO price multiplied by the number o EDGAR. Book-to-market is computed as the book v e of primary shares in the offering divided by the firm's market capitalization. At th month of trading, the IPO firm is matched to a size and book-to-market portfolio. 19 The for the IPO is computed as the buy-and-hold return on the issuer for the following twelv the buy-and-hold return on the size and book-to-market portfolio.
18 Loughran and Ritter (2002b) find the CRSP misstates number of shares outstanding when the firm has more than one class of shareholders. 19 We use the Fama-French 100 portfolio cutoffs (ten market capitalization by ten book-to-market). See http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html for details. 20 If the issuer delists prior to 12 months, the abnormal return calculation ends at the month of delisting. We also considered other long-run return windows (up to three years) and found similar results to those presented here.
underpricing. This is not consistent with certification (which would predict a negative change) or market e and statistically arrival of the allpete for business.
Abnormal one-year post IPO performance is significantly positive prior to the arrival of the all-star and falls a statistically significant 11.1% following the arrival of the all-star. This is consistent with the share. It is also arket IPOs during windows of opportunity when inve alyst turnover, but become more positive afterward. This is consistent with certification.
For the investment bank losing the all-star, we find little to suggest that there is a decline in e all-star, which is ing the departure price adjustment is positive and significant prior to the departure of the star, which indicates an ability to extract positive information. There is no significant change after the star's departure. Abnormal compensation is significantly positive pre-move and declines significantly following the departure of the star. Thus, banks cutting spreads and competing more on price, consistent with the bank agg ced reputation are
Analyst forecasts -hypotheses
For banks losing or gaining stars, we examine several measures of analyst activity on issues taken public by the bank, including the proportion of IPOs where the analyst is first to make a forecast on the issuing firm, the number of forecasts made on the issuing firm over the year after it goes public, the days The bank aggressiveness hypothesis makes similar predictions regarding frequency of forecasts for both banks associated with the analyst turnover. To more agg for business, banks both losing and gaining a star earnings forecasts should also become more positive, relative to consensus, for both ba 21 In related work, Clarke et al. (2003) examine the decision by star analysts to drop or retain coverage in a given security following their switch to a new investment bank. They find that analysts are more likely to retain coverage on a stock when the likelihood of receiving future investment-banking business from the firm is high. For the bank losing the all-star, we find that the remaining analysts also become somewhat more aggressive. In the year following the departure of the star, these analysts issue their first forecasts on initial public offerings for which their bank was the lead underwriter 11.8 days earlier than before the allstar departed. There is no significant change in the number of recommendations issued for each IPO, nor does the forecast error change significantly following the departure of the star. The standard deviation of
Analyst forecasts -Empirical methods and results
We consider a number of proxies designed to capture the aggressiveness of First forecast is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the lead investment bank first recommendation is the number of calendar days from the initial public offering' first forecast by the lead investment bank. We define analyst forecast error as the earnings per shar
In Table 6 , we examine the impact of all-star turnover on various me performance. For the bank gaining the all-star, we find an increase in analyst aggress issue a statistically significant 1.1 more forecasts, on average, than before the arrival o investment bank is slightly more conservative than the consensus estimate, and significantly after the arrival of the star. There is a significant increase in the standar forecast error. This is consistent with results in the previous section suggesting that th takes on more speculative deals following the arrival of the star analyst.
the forecast error does not change significantly following the departure of the star, suggesting that the bank does not take on more speculative deals.
Factors affecting IPO market share for banks with analyst turnovers
In this section we examine in a multivariate regression framework the factors affecting aggregate 22
Dunbar (2000) we er to the year after e year prior to the move. Our regressions build on Dunbar's in three ways. First, we estimate separate regressions for banks losing and gaining the star. Since the market share effects of turnover are different for these two groups changes and IPO rs than considered iously considered.
Third, we also include variables that capture the change in factors related to IPO performance and analyst behavior in our regressions. Evidence in section 5 suggests that bank and analyst performance changes mine whether that ly as independent an abnormal first standard deviation of abnormal price adjustments, the mean abnormal one-year returns, the standard deviation of abnormal oneyear returns, the percentage of first forecasts, the mean number of recommendations per IPO, the mean days to first recommendation per IPO, the mean forecast error and the standard deviation of forecast error.
investment bank market share changes around all-star analyst turnovers. Following regress the change in aggregate market share from the year prior to the analyst turnov the turnover year on various factors that capture the bank's performance on IPOs in th of banks, as reported earlier, we would expect the relations between market share performance factors to be different. Second, we include more IPO performance facto previously. We also examine factors capturing analyst behavior that have not been prev after the star turnover. Including change in performance factors allows us to deter changed behavior had an impact on market share.
In our regressions, we include all performance measures considered previous variables. Specifically, we include as independent variables in our regressions the me day returns, the mean abnormal spreads, the mean abnormal price adjustments, the All these variables are measured over the year prior to the analyst turnover. We also include in our regr after the turnover. Given the high correlations among some independent variables, we report univariate and multivariate model results. We only report our most parsimonious models (i.e. we do not report univariate regressions for variables that are not significant and do not include those variables in our multivariate models. In model (1), we find that the average market-to-book ratio in the departing analyst's industry is negatively related to changes in market share of the bank gaining the star. This result is inconsistent with the argument that analysts in high-growth firms are particularly valuable (it is consistent with the valuation share changes and mean abnormal first day returns, standard deviation of abnormal standard deviation of abnormal one-year returns, the percentage of first forecasts, recommendations per IPO, mean forecast error, and the standard deviation of forecast error.
firms they take public. This aggressiveness in turn allows the bank to expand its m aggressiveness hypothesis would predict a negative relation between market share c abnormal spreads, mean abnormal one-year returns and days to first recommendation. market share.
In addition to the bank and analyst performance variables noted above, w dummy variables to capture the nature of the analyst turnover. These variables emerge star analyst was ranked first, second or third team by , and whet similar pre-move reputation (proxied by Carter-Manaster rank). We also include the m of the analyst's industry as a control given the evidence in Table 3 .
In Table 7 we present the various regression model estimates for the bank g uncertainty story discussed previously). In model (2) Table 6 ), those banks that do become more aggressive are rewarded with increases to their market share.
positively related to mean abnormal one-year returns, consistent with the certification coefficient on the change in mean abnormal one-year return is not significant, indicati does not respond to changes in IPO performance after the star analyst turnover. In mod banks taking on more speculative offerings expand their market share. The coefficien standard deviation of abnormal one-year return is not significant, indicating that the respond to changes in the volatility of IPO performance after the star analyst turnover.
change in standard deviation of abnormal price adjustment is not significant, indicatin
does not respond to changes in the volatility of price adjustments after the star ana specification (5), we find a positive (but insignificant) relation between market share the first post-IPO forecast and market share changes. This is consistent with m aggressiveness. As banks move to increase their frequency of first forecasts, they higher market shares. In model (6) we find a significantly positive relation between m and market share changes. We also find a significantly positive relation between
In regressions (7) to (9) of Table 7 , we estimate multivariate regression models using the ormance measures nsignificant). The
. The mean pre-move abnormal one-year return becomes insignificant, as does the change in mean forecast errors, however.
In Table 8 , we present similar regression model estimates for the bank losing the all-star. As in te and multivariate report univariate n our multivariate models). In model (1), we find that market share changes are negatively related to a dummy variable taking the value one if the star is replaced. This is consistent with prior evidence in Table 3 . In model mal initial returns, tent with evidence ial return is also significantly positive, indicating that the market responds to changes in IPO initial performance after the star analyst leaves. In model (3) we find that market share changes are significantly positively related to olatility measure).
ggests that banks justment (and its changes) has a significantly positive effect on market share changes, consistent with certification and aggressiveness. In specification (5), we find a significantly positive relation between market share changes and the mean number of forecasts made by bank prior to losing the star. This is consistent with the market power and aggressiveness hypotheses. The coefficient on the change in mean number of forecasts is not significant, indicating that the market does not respond to changes in forecast volume after the star analyst turnover. Model (6) shows similar findings for the mean days until first recommendation.
significant factors identified in regressions (1) to (5). We do not include the IPO perf together given their high correlations (when included together, all coefficients become i evidence in regressions (7) to (9) generally is consistent with that from prior models Table 7 , given high correlations among some independent variables, we report univaria model results. We also only report our most parsimonious models (i.e. we do not regressions for variables that are not significant and do not include those variables i (8) and (9) of table 8, we estimate multivariate regression models using the significant factors identified in regressions (1) abnormal one-year return and the standard deviation of abnormal price adjustments to high correlations (when included together, all coefficients become insignificant).
regressions (8) and (9) generally is consistent with that from prior models. The dumm however.
Overall, the evidence on factors affecting investment bank market share change turnover is primarily consistent with the market power and aggressiveness hypotheses.
rns are positively related to market share changes. Both losing and acquiring an all-star has a significant impact on the performan ng the all-star attempts to compete on price by cutting fees. Analysts at the bank aggressive by issuing forecasts sooner after an IPO.
Building on the analysis in Dunbar (2000), we also examine the factors affec underpricing. Banks leaving more money on the table are rewarded with increased market. For both banks losing and gaining a This table reports descriptive statistics for the change in market share around all-star analyst turnover. The sample consists of 222 cases Investor All-Star left one investment bank for another. Market share is defined as the sum of gross proceeds (not including the overall investment bank in a given period divided by the sum of gross proceeds on all IPOs over the same period. Industry market share is similar issues in the all-star analyst's Fama-French industry are considered. We calculate aggregate and industry-level market share for one-year p the departure where an Institutional otment option) for the ly defined, where only rior and one-year after of the all-star analyst. Number of IPOs in industry is defined as the number of issues in the same Fama-French industry over the year prior to the analyst's departure. . This table shows changes in market share for the bank gaining the all-star analyst, stratified by various variables. The Carter-Manas Manaster (1990) ranking on a 0-9 scale for the book manger of the IPO. If an underwriter always appears in the highest bracket of the u the prospectus, it is assigned the top ranking of 9 on a 0-9 scale. Market share is defined as the sum of gross proceeds (not including the for the investment bank in a given period divided by the sum of gr ter rank is the Carternderwriting section of overallotment option) oss proceeds on all IPOs over the same period. Industry market share is similarly defined, where only issues in the all-star analyst's Fama-French industry are considered. This table shows changes in market share for the bank losing the all-star analyst, stratified by various variables. The Carter-Manaster rank (1990) ranking on a 0-9 scale for the book manger of the IPO. If an underwriter always appears in the highest bracket of the under prospectus, it is assigned the top ranking of 9 on a 0-9 scale. Market share is defined as the sum of gross proceeds (not including the ov the investment bank in a given period divided by the sum of g is the Carter-Manaster writing section of the erallotment option) for ross proceeds on all IPOs over the same period. Industry market share is similarly defined, where only issues in the all-star analyst's Fama-French industry are considered. Deviation, defined as the standard deviation of stock returns from days +21 to +50 relative to the IPO (see Johnson and Miller, 1988 , Carter Dark and Singh, 1998 , and Lowry and Schwert, 2002 .
We include three measures of investment bank reputation and certification in our analysis. We also control for market return prior to the IPO. We include Market Return, defined as
Market Return + takes the same value as Market Return whenever it is positive, and 0 and Ritter, 2002b, and Lowry and Schwert, 2002) . As an additional meas market activity we include Lagged Average Underpricing, the mean first-day returns year prior to the offering of IPOs in the same industry (see Benveniste, Ljungqvist, W 2002, and DuCharme, Rajgopal and Sefcik, 2001) . Industry is defined using the Fa (1997) 48-industry group classification scheme, which is based on primary SIC codes SDC. Finally we include two measures of IPO in 1996, and Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm and Yu, 2002) . gross proceeds on all re considered. Carters more than one book eturn + equals the buy e standard deviation of ial return for issues on e IPO. Lagged Avg. Industry Underpricing is the average initial return for issues from the same Fama-French Industry over the year prior to the IPO. Number of Prior Industry IPOs is the number of issues in the same Fama-French industry over the year prior to the IPO. Estimates reported are an average of year-by-year regression coefficients and t-statistics are based on the standard deviation of the times-series of coefficient estimates. R 2 is the average value of the R 2 from year-by-year regressions.
Loughran

Independent
The dependent variables are defined as follows. IPO initial return defined as 100*(P 1 -P 0 )/P 0 where P 1 is the first-day closing stock pr (from CRSP) and P 0 is the IPO offer price. Price Revision is the IPO offer price divided by the average of the high and low initial f percentage). IPO percentage spread is the gross underwriter spread per share dividend by the offering price per share (states as a per variables are defined as follows. IPO proceeds is the offering price multiplied by the number of shares sold (including global shares, exclu option) in millions of dollars. Logarithm of IPO proceeds is the natural logarithm of IPO proceeds. Price revision is as defined above. 
